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Preface   
Uwe Beckmeyer 
The German maritime sector is traditionally important to the German economy. In order 
to maintain our lead what is a highly competitive market, we now need to focus on re-
search and development activities. As a major exporter, Germany needs maritime safety 
and security that it can rely on. Given the increasing role that information technology is 
playing in the maritime sector, we are now facing the threat of cyber-attacks on maritime 
infrastructure.
According to feedback from both government and industry, awareness about cyber se-
curity in the maritime sector has been comparatively low since this first became an issue 
over two decades ago. The strengths of the shipping and maritime industries are based on 
many years of experience and on their capacity to reliably perform central tasks: ensuring 
that seafaring is safe and secure, serving offshore platforms, and transporting persons and 
goods in order to support passenger traffic and global supply chains. For a number of diffe-
rent reasons, the development cycles for upgrading critical communication, navigation and 
operational components on, for example, bridges and infrastructure are slower than in cer-
tain other industrial sectors. However, now that the maritime sector has begun to make use 
of information technology and automation processes, this situation has begun to change.
4As a result of these developments, government and private industry have started to fo-
cus on a range of issues relating to awareness of cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime 
sector. Given the importance of the maritime economy for both Germany and Europe, it 
is absolutely essential that a systematic and deep-reaching analysis of current and future 
dangers and threats be undertaken. By basing this analysis on information provided by 
maritime customers, we will ensure that the maritime sector will be prepared for actual 
future challenges. The development of new technologies to protect maritime systems and 
infrastructure against cyber threats will not only safeguard the economic system, including 
global trade routes, but will also strengthen the position of German technology providers 
in what is a highly competitive international market. Furthermore, this initiative will serve 
to supplement a number of government measures in the maritime sector, such as the Nati-
onal Maritime Technologies Masterplan and the new High-Tech Strategy – Innovation for 
Germany.
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Cyber Risks an Threats: 
A Demanding Challenge for 
the Maritime Industry
Georg Klöcker 
On June 21 2015, 1,400 passengers of the polish airline LOT stranded at Warsaw Chopin 
Airport. What happened was that hacker had attacked the computer systems of the nati-
onal airline, hence 10 national and international flights were cancelled, a dozen delayed. 
According to the airline, the offender paralyzed the computer systems which manage the 
flight plans.
On May 12 2015, the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(German: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) informed the administration of the German 
Bundestag that its computer system “Parlakom” had been hacked and attacked to an exten-
sive degree because the offenders illegally used administrator rights to steal a big volume 
of data and thereby also obtained access e.g. to confidential e-mails of members of 
parliament.
In 2011, a criminal syndicate took advantage of the general security vulnerability in the 
computer systems of cargo owners, container services and the port of Antwerp. Undis-
covered they smuggled cocaine and heroin for years from South America to Europe and 
stored the drugs between cargo and goods in containers which they tracked until the drugs 
had reached their target location.
These three examples out of numerous cyber incidents during the last few years show very 
clearly in which way criminal and terrorist actions could, or most likely will strike us in 
future and how vulnerable our infrastructures are - especially when it comes to sensitive 
structures such as information, communication and supply relevant systems. All three ex-
amples highlight the potential of damage and loss cyber attacks can cause to the European 
economic system and its societies. 
The same risks also apply when it comes to cyber warfare between states. NATO Deputy 
Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Jamie Shea, assessed in 
2014 that:
6“for the first time we state explicitly that the cyber realm is covered by Article 5 
of the Washington Treaty, the collective defense clause. We don‘t say in exactly 
which circumstances or what the threshold of the attack has to be to trigger a 
collective NATO response and we don‘t say what that collective NATO respon-
se should be… This will be decided by allies on a case-by-case basis, but we 
established a principle that at a certain level of intensity of damage, malicious 
intention, a cyber-attack could be treated as the equivalent of an armed attack.”¹
Maritime industry and logistics, today, are based on its solutions with global interfaces to 
improve efficiency and international networking. Technical dimensions of shipping and 
of ships themselves are not only depending on its technology in cases of communicati-
on. Various data like machinery performances are submitted automatically to basement 
institutions or shipping companies, comparable to the airfreight industry. The process of 
information technologies will definitely proceed and, as a logical consequence, turn into 
complex risk-scenarios which currently seem to be difficult to be solved. Substantial and 
challenging questions therefore are: 
How are we going to handle digital attacks in general, especially regarding on how to de-
tect and to deter them as well as to defend our systems and structures? 
Are we nowadays capable to understand and to determine the dimension cyber risks and 
threats imply, which at the end seems to be an important precondition concerning the im-
plementation of adequate measures?
Jamie Shea, quoted in: Ranger, Steve (2014): NATO updates cyber defence policy as digital attacks be-
come a standard part of conflict. NATO has updated its cyber defence policy in the light of a number 
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Let us take a step back: According to the CIA World Factbook the German coastline mea-
sures 2,389 kilometers; not more than 3.6 percent of the coastline of the European Union 
in total. However, Germany is quite a maritime country when it comes to the capacities of 
the maritime industry as well as certainly to Germanys strong export economy. 
This, on the other hand, is predominantly depending on external primary energies, products 
and materials. The economic strength of Germany is knotted very strongly to external 
impacts and therefore depends on operational trade routes, efficient logistical networks as 
well as on secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and safe infrastructures. There are 
approximately 2,750 so-called hidden champions existing worldwide, 1.300 (48 percent) 
are German owned midsized enterprises which are global market leader within their in-
dustries. The German economy is with an increasing tendency strongly engaged in for-
eign markets, or even enrooted. According to a poll conducted by the German Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry in 2015, the German industry increasingly invests in foreign 
countries to approach promising markets with higher growth potentials than traditional 
regions of interest. Furthermore, companies these days go for cost efficiency and therefore 
seek direct access especially to raw materials and products and of course to specialized 
local personnel.
The last decade clearly showed the interdependency and importance of safe and secure 
SLOCs. Because of the increase in piracy especially along the coast of Somalia, maritime 
security moved into the focus of interest of all engaged and effected stakeholders. The 
instability of Somalia, the lack of a capable government and true international aid led into 
fragility, chaos and at the end into a failed state. Land-based economic and social prob-
lems developed into top priority maritime threats. During 2007 and 2013, the international 
maritime industry faced a quick raise of piracy incidents within, initially, the Golf of Aden 
(GoA). A problem no one really had on the agenda now popped-up and within months 
became a mayor topic for the shipping industry worldwide. Since 2013, the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) releases strongly decreasing numbers of approaches and attacks. 
Up to date numbers have dropped down tremendously. What are the reasons for these de-
velopments and how can they be preserved? The director of the IMB, Pottengal Mukundan, 
stated late 2014 that:
“the single biggest reason for the drop in worldwide piracy is the decrease in 
Somali piracy off the coast of East Africa. […] IMB says Somali pirates have 
been deterred by a combination of factors, including the key role of internatio-
8All stakeholders involved developed, coordinated and implemented relevant structures, 
processes and operational measures. The international alliance installed appropriate mis-
sions along the Horn of Africa and a greater operational area in the Indian Ocean which 
were authorized by the national parliaments of the participating member states. Within 
their mandates, the international allied forces still today protect merchant vessels against 
attacks. The answer to piracy therefore was to pool the perception of challenges and to 
share solution building processes and operational actions. 
German politics and the shipping industry discussed right from the beginning of this new 
generation of piracy the need, the benefit and the legal possibilities of the deployment of 
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on merchant vessels. The Ger-
man Parliament adopted the relevant law (German: Seeschiffbewachungsverordnung), 
which not only legalized and organized the employment of Private Maritime Security 
Companies (PMSC) but constitutes a clear legal framework and represents the first high 
quality standard for private security services on board of German flagged vessels. The 
maritime industry itself e.g. developed guidelines (Best Management Practice, BMP) to 
harden vessels against attacks and established a Piracy-Reporting Center as well as coope-
rations e.g. Maritime Security Center - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) which was established 
by EU NAVFOR. All risk relevant reports and counter piracy measures clearly affect in-
surance-relevant risk rating e.g. when it comes to kidnap and ransom or war cover insuran-
ces. Speaking about piracy there are established structures between politics, the maritime 
industry, insurance, security, and relevant national authorities in charge.
As pictured at the beginning, today we are facing a new asymmetrical threat and challenge. 
The up-to-date-reported cyber attacks on maritime infrastructures such as ports and logistic 
hubs as well as on ocean going vessels are just the tip of the iceberg we are heading to. 
Today, we are just able to adumbrate its depth and complexity. We do not seem to be ca-
Mukundan, Pottengal (2014): Somali pirate clampdown caused drop in global piracy, IMB reveals, online 
in:https://icc-ccs.org/news/904-somali-pirate-clampdown-caused-drop-in-global-piracy-imb-reveals, 
15.01.2014 (State: 30.07.2015).
nal navies, the hardening of vessels, the use of private armed security teams, and 
the stabilizing influence of Somalia’s central government. […] It is imperative to 
continue combined international efforts to tackle Somali piracy. Any complacency 
at this stage could re-kindle pirate activity.” ²
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pable to clearly foresee the impact on the security of our trade routes, infrastructures and 
logistical networks. The perception of cyber attacks is much younger than the existing thre-
at itself and it implies much more asymmetrical components and complex threat potential 
than piracy does. This is the major problem and challenge we are facing: the controllability 
of risks begins with the holistic comprehension of the threat. 
Digital threats both stem from governmental institutions and criminal groups. Most badly 
affected aims of cyber attacks are risk dimensions of maritime business and logistics and 
especially include interest of the ship, its cargo and also liability-relevant items. The mar-
ket of transport insurances yet does not offer at least one general standardized solution in 
reference to these special threats. While some policies include cyber risks, others excep-
tionally don’t. It is still very unsure if and how cyber risks are going to be dealt with in 
the future. That is why defending, analyzing and managing cyber risks are highly relevant 
processes so far. 
This publication shall initiate a process to find an efficient solution in reference to the spe-
cial conditions of maritime shipping industry by seizing active processes of other business 
dimensions and related industries. This introduction and the following articles sketch the 
basis for the political and security policy aspects related to maritime cyber security. It is an 
attempt to set the political framework for the issues at stake. In the digital information age 
following the wake of an ever globalized world cyber security as well as its complexity, 
however, requires a much broader treatment, by both, academia and practitioners. E-appli-
cations penetrate all facets of society and thus an inter- and transdisciplinary approach on 
an academic level should be accompanied by detailed theoretical and practical analyses of 
technical, economic, legal, governance, insurance-related, ethical and anthropologic fac-
tors. The publishers and authors are convinced that only such holistic approach, consisting 
of various theoretical, empirical and policy-related concepts and addressing multifaceted 
aspects of cyber security, has the capability to contribute to a sustainable reduction and 
mitigation of cyber risks in the maritime domain.
Future publications of this series will accompany the general security policy framework 
by providing an overview on the state of research in security studies, discuss the ethical 
dimension of the contrast between liberty and security and highlight the psychological and 
technical factors of human-machine interactions in maritime cyber security. Furthermore, 
technical aspects, addressing vessel, port and terminal automation and security, general 
IT-security (and safety) and the implementations of business solutions will be put forward. 
Legal experts, insurance providers and public as well as international actors will provide 
10
insights in the policy frameworks and daily practices of current trends and developments in 
protecting valuable maritime assets and critical infrastructure at sea. Lastly, the final issue 
of the series will deal with concrete policy recommendations that will help to proactively 
increase cyber security and mitigate risks evolving in case of successful attacks.
On the basis of the introductory article on security policy aspects of the maritime cyber se-
curity (Masala/Tsetsos 2015), the following article by Christoph Günther (2015) will cover 
the technical aspects of e-navigation, vessel automation and maritime traffic surveillance 
and discuss their strengths and weaknesses as well as address potential technical solutions 
that can minimize the risks. It thus represents the first detailed analysis of this series. 
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A Demanding Challenge for 
the Maritime Industry
Carlo Masala and Konstantinos Tsetsos 
1. The Emerging Relationship between Maritime Security and Cyber Security
In the digital information age e-enabled vehicles, vessels, infrastructure, communication 
and management systems are the norm. As the vanguard of globalization worldwide air, 
maritime and land-based transportation, communication and mobility are increasingly de-
pendent on information and communication technology (ICT), network-centric operations 
and wireless communication systems. The impact of digitization in commerce and services 
has, in part, enabled the pace with which globalization is taking place. Cyber-physical 
control systems, traffic control, logistics, network operations and safety management sys-
tems represent the tools to keep the increasingly interconnected global economy effecti-
ve, profitable and on track. Although the maritime domain represents the most important 
benchmark for the global economic development, maritime cyber security has received 
only little attention. In fact, most of the world’s largest ports have only limited cyber secu-
rity strategies or cyber incident response plans in place, while the involved organizations 
have yet to establish company-wide cyber risk awareness programs. Future cyber threats 
will originate from hackers and crackers, often thousands of kilometers away from their 
targets, and their ability to crack vital vessel and port systems may very well have severer 
consequences for the maritime domain than more visible threats posed by maritime ter-
rorism or piracy ever had. This is even more surprising considering the fact that modern 
maritime trade and the flawless functionality of ports represents a necessary prerequisite 
for contemporary industrial and service-based economies. Maritime trade is so crucial that 
even small disruptions would seriously hamper the flow of global commodities, raw mate-
rials and resources and lead to economic implications of unmeasurable proportions. 
Current maritime security primarily deals with physical safety and security. Originating 
from accident investigation safety aspects concentrate on the prevention of environmental 
pollution and accident mitigation, such as ship collisions and vessel survivability, whereas 
maritime security aspects are characterized by anti-piracy and anti-terror measures, port 
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security, prevention of vessel misuse and maritime surveillance. Both maritime safety and 
security rely heavily on network-operated systems, information and communication tech-
nology, while ports more and more employ digital logistic systems (such as automated 
entry and cargo management systems or autonomous cranes). Ports and cargo terminals 
are the most important critical infrastructures and play a key role in facilitating a country’s 
access to international trade. They represent the gateway and entry point to the global mar-
ket, are intangible economic assets and valuable hubs in any supply chain. They connect 
the producers, suppliers and distributors with the customers and play a crucial role for 
the national and regional economic development. In light of increasing tonnage of goods, 
cargo and containers international ports have to process, automation and digitization have 
gradually acquired a major role in keeping logistic supply chains running.
Own creation by the authors. Cyber security awareness was assessed by (1) the existence of a cyber security 
section on the port’s homepage, (2) cyber-related security reports by port authorities, (3) an analysis of 
security measures information provided by port authorities, (4) the existence of a cyber security office, and 
(5) telephonic inquiries made by the authors over the existence of cyber-related action and awareness plans 
with public relations offices of the respective ports.
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# Port Country Volume 2013  
(in million TEUs) 
Cyber Security  
awareness program 
1 Shanghai China 32.53 Yes 
2 Singapore Singapore 31.65 Yes 
3 Hong Kong China 23.10 Yes 
4 Shenzhen China 22.94 No 
5 Busan South Korea 17.04 No 
6 Ningbo-Zhoushan China 16.83 No 
7 Guangzhou Harbor China 14.74 No 
8 Qingdao China 14.50 No 
9 Jebel Ali, Dubai United Arab Emirates 13.30 Yes 
10 Tianjin China 12.30 No 
11 Rotterdam Netherlands 11.87 No 
12 Port Kelang Malaysia 10.00 No 
13 Kaohsiung Taiwan  9.78 No 
14 Hamburg Germany 8.86 Yes 
15 Antwerp Belgium 8.64 Yes 
Figure 1:  Top 15 world container ports and cyber security awareness3 
The need for further automation and digitization stems from the fact, that more and more 
producers, suppliers and ports have adopted a zero-inventory “just-in-time” delivery system 
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The need for further automation and digitization stems from the fact, that more and more 
producers, suppliers and ports have adopted a zero-inventory “just-in-time” delivery sys-
tem to increase, both, their processing speed and their economic competitiveness. In cont-
rast to land-based critical infrastructure and air-based navigation or traffic control systems, 
cyber security in the maritime domain is still in its nascence phase. As figure 1 shows nine 
of the 
top 15 world container ports do not publically address IT security issues on their main 
homepages, an indication that highlights a limited cyber risk awareness culture. This article 
will discuss current trends in maritime digitization, highlight the risks and vulnerabilities 
for ports and vessels stemming from increased automation and reflect on the necessity 
of political cyber security measures in the maritime domain. Technical aspects maritime 
systems, even if briefly explained in the course of this article, will be elaborated with in-
creased detail by the subsequent article of Günther (2015).
2. The Future Relevance of Maritime, Infrastructures and Port Cyber Security
For ports, two distinct trends of digitization are dominant: terminal and vessel automation. 
Terminal automation encompasses terminal operation and container terminal manage-
ment systems. Automated container terminal entrance, for instance, increasingly becomes 
fully automated with sensors (registering weight), RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), 
barcodes (cataloguing cargo details) and cameras (capturing truck license plates, drivers 
and registration codes using so-called Optical Character Recognition/OCR and detecting 
process anomalies using Computer Vision/CV). OCR and CV help port authorities keeping 
track of containers, vehicles and detecting damaged containers. It also increases a supervi-
sor’s awareness about dangerous cargo that must be separated or receive special treatment 
in case of fires or other accidents. This enables port authorities and customers to track 
their cargo, receive updates about container processing status, current position and access 
information about the status of the cargo (humidity, temperature or other data). Terminal 
automation also digitizes on-site security by featuring an ID card system for personnel, 
vehicles and containers and CCTV systems. CCTV systems allows tracking involved em-
ployees or unauthorized personnel in case of cargo theft, damage or in cases of viola-
tions of operational safety. In addition, ports increasingly rely on autonomous vehicles and 
crane systems to manage, store, load and transport containers. Next to port and terminal 
automation vessel automation has been introduced to ships over the last decades. Radar, 
automatic identification systems, electronic chart display information systems, GPS, radio 
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and satellite communications, ship collision avoidance systems as well as internet access 
are considered vital components of modern navigation. On state-of-the-art ships all tho-
se systems are interconnected in integrated bridge systems. Vessel automation outsources 
basic communications (such as positioning, routing, schedule and radar data) to automatic 
systems that relay this information to traffic systems and maritime authorities. In navigati-
on, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) introduced an e-navigation strategy and 
this indicates that the future of navigation will depend on secure information technology to 
facilitate communication between the sea and shore. With the future of seafaring charac-
terized by e-navigation, digitization will further dominate maritime traffic and transport. 
For a more thorough discussion of technologic aspects of vessel automation see Günther 
(2015: p. 27-46) following this article.
Further attempts to address the increasingly digital future of the maritime domain have 
been made. The 2010 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) - Manila Amendments introduced Electro Technical 
Officers (ETOs) on every cruise ship, indicating the need for on-board professionals hand-
ling cyber-related tasks. Thus, the maritime fields related to cyber security encompass mul-
tiple areas ranging from maritime information and surveillance systems as well as traffic 
control and navigation systems to port and cargo database security in harbors and the pro-
tection of critical infrastructure by enhancing cyber security and installing redundancies. 
While vessel and terminal automation as well as e-navigation is intended to increase safety 
and benefit productivity, efficiency, and the ability to process and distribute more and more 
cargo, both lead to increased cyber risks and security vulnerabilities that endanger ports 
and vessels. Coupled with the “zero-inventory” ideology in modern maritime commerce 
a disruption of the flow of basic resources, spare parts, consumer goods, and essential 
materials could lead to both, empty warehouses for producers as well as empty shelves 
for consumers in grocery stores. Next to ports and in more general terms sea lines of com-
munication, maritime-based critical infrastructures that encompass off-shore wind energy 
facilities, oil and gas rigs are similarly vital. Energy infrastructures depend on sophisticated 
ICT that controls vital systems, communications and production procedures. Malicious 
software infestations thus can limit productivity of energy outputs, cause environmental 
pollution (i.e. oil spills) and ultimately even lead to the loss of human lives (by triggering 
an explosion in cases where safety systems are overridden).
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3. Risks and Vulnerabilities for Ports, Vessels, Critical Infrastructures 
and Maritime Economy 
Both state and private actors will have to address the emerging risks and vulnerabilities that 
arise in conjunction with increased digitization in a holistic manner. Classic security risks 
and vulnerabilities originate in relation to cargo, vessels, critical infrastructures, economic 
assets, trade flows and people involved. They range from the misuse of ships as weapons, 
cargo theft, smuggling, money laundering, and illegal migration to direct attacks on vessels, 
ports, and personnel, anthropogenic environmental disasters, and piracy. The relationship 
of those physical security threats and cyber risks is crucial with access to critical systems 
exponentially increasing the likelihood of a successful attack or disruption. Subsequently, 
a consideration of cyber security aspects in developing a maritime security strategy is 
relevant for state and private actors alike that seek to prevent and mitigate different types 
of threats to commercial, civilian and military naval operations. State and private actors re-
quire cyber security strategies to protect vital assets and harden their resilience in cases of 
third-party digital interference. According to the IBM Cyber Security Index 2013 the ma-
jority of cyber attacks originate from opportunists (49%), industrial espionage, terrorism, 
financial crime and data theft (23%) or from disgruntled employees (15%). The main tools 
are usually malicious code (such as malware planted inside the security perimeter) (35%) 
or investigative scans (external probing outside the security perimeter) (28%) that analyze 
weak points of targeted systems. It is important to note that the majority of elements that 
contributed to vulnerability and risks and subsequently to breaches of company systems 
originated from misconfigured systems (42%) and end-user errors (31%). 
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Given the increasing frequency of cyber attacks in the maritime domain, cyber assets in 
need of protection first and foremost encompass (1) critical digital traffic/communication 
systems, (2) critical information/databases, (3) automated terminal and vessel systems, and 
(4) critical infrastructures.
(1) Organized crime, terrorist groups, pirates, and other malevolent actors active in the 
maritime domain can interfere with vital systems and access databases. Hacking, cracking 
or hijacking of critical traffic and guidance systems can facilitate the misuse or misdirecti-
on of vessels in maritime chokepoints or the vicinity of ports with grave consequences. It 
can also be used to disguise cargo or ship movements of specific vessels used to transport 
illegal cargo, such as weapons, drugs or other contraband. Next to the physical damage 
ship collisions or environmental pollution can cause, the seizure of digital traffic systems 
would result in incalculable economic damages and logistical chain disruptions. In additi-
on, accessing ship tracking data and shipment information could allow malevolent actors to 
single out particularly high-value targets for attacks or use that information for targeted hi-
jackings. Recent analysis of existing maritime traffic systems revealed (see Günther 2015) 
that key technologies such as GPS, Automatic Identification System (AIS), and the system 
for viewing digital nautical charts (Electronic Chart Display and Information System/EC-
DIS) are prone to hacking attacks and feature poor cyber security standards (Reuters 2014). 
For instance, “[…] researchers have discovered that flaws in the AIS vessel tracking sys-
tem can allow attackers to hijack communications of existing vessels, create fake vessels, 
trigger false SOS or collision alerts and even permanently disable AIS tracking on any 
vessel” (Security Intelligence Blog 2014). Using such exploits of the AIS infrastructure 
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to their advantage pirates have impersonated maritime authorities and lured ships into 
changing its course or seize all communications, concealed their ships with fake (or coast 
guard) IDs, sent false weather reports to incite course changes or sent out false distress 
signals to lure ships into dangerous waters. In conjunction with GPS spoofing malevolent 
actors can alter the course of any vessel, anytime anywhere (see figure 2).
Fugure 2: Course information of fake vessel in the Adriatic Sea after an AIS-hack4
(2) The data can also be used to harm a particular company by blackmailing it, providing 
peer competitors with cargo information, prices, ship schedule and speed or destinations 
and engage in other related activities that diminish the profitability or even survival of a 
shipping company. In addition, illegally acquired personal information can enable male-
volent actors to target vital individuals (such as security personnel or senior management) 
and blackmail or bribe them for their purposes. In such cases crackers can access vital sys-
tems unnoticed and extract information that relates to port or vessel security or company 
information. Such actions are far from fiction as a recent example remarkably shows. In 
2011, two companies operating in the port of Antwerp were targeted by hackers in em-
ployment of organized crime. The group awaited concealed cocaine that had been hidden 
in legitimate containers transporting bananas and timber from South America to Europe. 
By accessing transport and position information criminals were able to steal containers 
unnoticed before the legitimate owners arrived at the port or attacked specific trucks on 
Available at: http://www.portvision.com/news---events/press-releases---news/bid/343898/AIS-Hacking-
Buzz-Hype-and-Facts [Accessed on: 30.09.2015].
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highways with assault rifles in order to acquire the respective containers. When the system 
breaches were discovered, the hackers installed key logging devices in order to extract 
entry codes and then seized the cargo disguised as legitimate lorry drivers. After operating 
almost two years, the group was tracked down by Europol in 2013 (BBC 2013). Currently, 
the majority of ports and maritime traffic information systems do not possess the necessary 
cyber security infrastructure and lack the required data protection capacities. Furthermore, 
the background checks for vital personnel are seldom extended to the point of encompas-
sing cyber vulnerability. This owes to the fact that the worldwide political and social awa-
reness about cyber security has not reached the maritime domain yet. 
(3) The same dynamics of vulnerability apply to terminal and vessel automation. The hija-
cking of digitized vessel and port systems can be used to conceal information about cargo 
in order to facilitate smuggling activities, to disrupt supply chains, to conduct espionage, 
distort the functionality of critical infrastructure and to put a port out of business by delibe-
rate database destruction or data confusion. 
(4) Regarding the hijacking or hacking of critical infrastructures worst-case scenario draw 
a catastrophic picture. A hacked security system on an oil rig can, as a recent example of 
worm infestation on a rig in the Gulf of Mexico shows, ultimately reduce the oil production 
to zero for several weeks. Depending on the targeted systems malware can render central 
components inoperable and in some cases even lead to physical damage. A coordinated 
attack of critical maritime infrastructures can thus put companies out of business or even 
limit the availability of energy (wind farms) and resources (oil, gas) for states in the targe-
ted region. In addition, to productivity losses, infected systems may lead to the failure of 
safety protocols and lead to oil spills or even explosion of the facility generating massive 
environmental pollution. Finally, due to the remoteness of some oil rigs hacked systems 
can in fact endanger the lives of the personnel working on such platforms by distorting 
the functionality of safety systems. Infection can originate either directly by downloads 
through satellite connections (as in recent cases from online sources featuring movies or 
pirated music sites), or be brought aboard on laptops, external hard drives and USB drives 
that were infected on land.
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Figure 4:  Potential threats against vessels and ports by cyber attacks 5
Information misuse that leads to maritime attacks (organized crime, terrorism, piracy) 
as well as information misuse by peer business competitors (i.e. business espionage, 
influencing price fluctuations, accessing proprietary company data as well as details of 
vessel schedules)
Concealing ship movements or cargo data by cracking related systems/ databases
Distortion of critical infrastructure architecture (i.e. port automated cargo systems or 
off-shore energy producing facilities)
Losing information sovereignty on ship position and distance to ports/coast guard/mili-
tary vessels
Disruption of communication, traffic and navigational systems
Infiltration of key personnel (Electro Technical Officer - ETOs) on ships by organized 
crime or other actors










In sum, the potential risks emerging from allegedly “soft” maritime security issues are 
diverse:
20
In light of the aforementioned cyber-related risks and vulnerabilities the adoption of nume-
rous approaches and practices by private and public actors are necessary. In the following 
section measures to increase cyber security and awareness as well as policy recommenda-
tions are directed at, both, private and public actors in the maritime domain.
4. Necessary Steps to Port and Vessel Cyber Security
The first step to increase cyber security for ports begins with an industry-wide cyber se-
curity strategy. In the best case it is fully embedded in and compatible to a national cyber 
security strategy of the respective host nation. The following recommendations are based 
on the IBM Essential Practices for Cyber Security and should be considered as vital by any 
actor, whether port or shipping company, in the maritime domain.
Increase cyber risk awareness: On the basis of such strategy private actor decision ma-
kers are required to build and ensure a risk-aware cyber culture amongst the employees 
of an organization. This can be achieved by targeted seminars, security briefings, estab-
lishing of a cyber risk and security department and by hiring specialists (either directly 
or as contractors). Cyber risk awareness should be implemented in a top-down approach 
until a security guard and a CEO of a company share the same awareness culture.
Cyber security by design: Most ports and vessels originate from an era where digitiz-
ation was less common and were retrofitted without cyber security being a top priority. 
Thus, ports need to implement modern cyber security systems ex-post or update older 
ones. Bearing in mind the lifecycle of ports and vessels this approach is unavoidable. 
However, when companies update their fleet and their equipment steps should be made 
to implement cyber security systems in conjunction with the upgrade process. With secu-
rity built-in by design a plethora of risks and vulnerabilities can be reduced significantly. 
Security considerations affect design decisions from the beginning. They can rule out 
certain design paths that would seem attractive if security is not a priority. Therefore, 
consultations of cyber security expert should be a part of every design step. As no design 
implementation can be completely secure, future security flaws should be considered, a 
fault tolerant included that can be fixed quickly and with low-effort in case of a security 
breach. Security research will be much more effective if open-source thus increasing the 
chance of a security flaw being found first by researchers and not by actors with malevo-
lent intentions. While open design standards ease the process of securing infrastructure, 
the actual implementation of the design should be diverse. A monoculture of hard- and 
software could endanger not only one part of an organization, but the organization as a 
›
›
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whole and to some degree affect the whole industry.
Workplace protection: Digital assets of a company require the best possible protection 
to ensure cyber security. Every digital device can be used as a Trojan horse to enter a pro-
tected network or system. Critical systems therefore should be redundant and separated 
from any infrastructure available to untrusted personnel. Every company laptop, smart-
phone and workplace should fulfill the same security standards as the company’s main 
server room. Guidelines for device configuration should be implemented and restricted 
and business-related usage only defined in order to reduce risks. 
Network and intranet access: A secure network setup is necessary to isolate malicious 
software and attacks quickly and prevent the spreading other parts of a system’s infra-
structure. Restricted and separated channels, supervised access points and selected user 
rights provide a suitable environment for a comprehensive cyber defense.
Detection mechanisms: Automated detection mechanisms to thwart cyber attacks are 
crucial. Depending on the size of a company or systems and data under management, 
intrusion detection provides the necessary warning tools that monitor undesired behavior 
and enable companies to respond quickly to cyber threats.
State-of-the-art and updates: For a secure system transparency is vital. Administrator 
should be able to oversee every program that is currently running on the system and be 
able to ensure that it is up-to-date. Running a multibillion dollar port on Windows 98/
NT server may be convenient but far from safe. Updates and patches are crucial in era-
dicating exploits and backdoors and should be installed as soon as they are available. All 
systems should be updated simultaneously since a hardened network can be compromi-
sed by just one overlooked system component. Also, long-term maintenance of dedica-
ted software must be ensured. A powerful piece of software can originate from a small 
contractor and therefore its security depends on the state of this contractor which is often 
unknown to the customer. This can be avoided by the customer when having full access 
to all documentation and source code and by publishing security risk through constant 
internal or external review of the software and its updates.
Cloud security: If an organization uses cloud services it should be aware of the risks 
and threats and capable of protecting its data by isolating it from other users in the cloud 
and the inherent access of the cloud provider. Encryption can overcome some of those 
risks but it is not always practicable. Crucial encrypted data that is secure today, can be 







Protect crucial assets: It is vital for companies to identify its critical assets (conditional 
documents, inventory and employee databases etc.) and direct special attention for their 
protection. A common practice of modern-day crackers is to attack several servers with 
denial-of-service attacks (DoS) and while a company’s cyber security team is distracted 
by this evident threat, the crucial assets/data are scanned and stolen. Therefore, critical 
assets require priority attention even if they are not under obvious attack.
Keep track of your employees: With 15% of all cyber attacks originating from dis-
gruntled or ex-employees it is vital to revoke access permission once the respective 
individual has left the company or is engaged in a different department.
Analyze your environment: The degree of interconnectedness of modern businesses in 
the maritime domain requires companies to extend the preceding recommendations and 
best practices to cooperating companies, sub-contractors, supplies, customers and on-si-
te neighbors. Ports, for example, are used by various companies with different backg-
rounds and potentially different risk cultures. The safety of a company’s system may be 
nullified if one’s contractors, neighbors or customers are negligent to potential cyber 
threats. Standardization in this regards cannot only increase security but also contributed 




5. Policy Recommendations for (State) and Private Actors
Necessity to Increase Awareness on Maritime Cyber Security
Participate in and sponsor awareness campaigns for governmental, military and mariti-
me authorities
Participate in guidance and training programs on the impact of maritime cyber security 
threats and their mitigation  
Establishment of cyber security programs for ports and maritime traffic control systems
Intra-, Intergovernmental, International and Private Cooperation
Participate in and sponsor the development of national and international standards, pro-
tocols, and systems for the implementation of maritime ICT systems
Implementation of national maritime cyber security guidelines
Coordination with regional and international organizations (e.g. IMO, IMB) and estab-
lishment of regional cyber security systems in the maritime domain
Establish a reporting culture for recognized or thwarted cyber attacks on an international, 
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Increasing private-public partnerships on the basis of national and regional cyber securi-
ty guidelines and best practices
Support development and implementation of critical infrastructure redundancy (opera-
ting Systems, GPS, etc.)
›
›
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) should be expanded beyond safety 
and physical security aspects
Revisions to national and international legal regulatory frameworks necessary to adapt to 
cyber-related maritime threats
Clarification of responsibilities and tasks between governmental and private key stake-
holders in maritime security
Provision of economic incentives to private stakeholder and businesses in the maritime 
domain to invest into port and maritime cyber security systems
State and private funding for the development of open-source maritime-related cyber 
security systems (software and hardware)
State and private actor sponsored cooperation with research institutions for the develop-
ment of resilient port and maritime cyber security systems and programs
Stimulate dialogue and information exchange between key stakeholders in the maritime 
sector and associated stakeholders
Navigational chart updates should be certified, include encrypted data and digital electro-
nic signatures to verify their source
Define roles and responsibilities towards cyber security in this sector on regional and 
national levels
E-navigation systems need to be secured to avoid data distortion or misuse
Develop appropriate cyber security training programs for port and traffic control 
personnel
Consider the establishment of company-wide cyber security officers and the hiring of 
ETOs for vital assets
New training and certification requirements for ETOs and improved measures to prevent 
fraudulent practices relating to modern technology such as electronic charts and infor-
mation systems


















Recent recorded cases of successful cyber attack on ports (such as Antwerp), critical in-
frastructures (oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico) and single vessels (such as the experimental 
GPS-spoofing attack on the “White Rose of Drachs”) as well as the sophistication with 
which terrorists, organized crime and pirates are employing modern technology to hijack, 
takeover, spy on or lure vessels off course requires the industry’s full attention. The evident 
weaknesses of established maritime traffic and communications systems (such as AIS and 
GPS) offer ample exploitation opportunities for malevolent actors, both governmental and 
non-state, and highlight existing vulnerabilities. Only a coordinated effort by international 
and corporate decision makers can increase international maritime safety and security stan-
dards to confront cyber-related threats to maritime trade and commerce. In addition, ports 
as the portals to a globalized world need to be hardened, both physically and digitally, to 
reduce the risks of cyber attacks and ultimately avoid disruption of global supply chains. 
Companies in the maritime sector as well as the respective governments should establish 
digital redundancies, countermeasures and procedures to protect critical infrastructure and 
vessels. This can only be achieved if an appropriate risk awareness culture is promoted and 
cultivated to fit the contemporary challenges of the digital information age. Ignoring these 
developments is perilous for both the state and private sector. States risk functionality dis-
ruptions of valuable economic trade hubs, may face environmental pollution of enormous 
proportions if ships are steered deliberately off course and could get exposed to severe 
economic consequences in the aftermath of successful cyber attacks on ports and critical 
maritime infrastructures. Maritime companies are in danger of forfeiting their economic 
competitiveness, risk the loss of critical business-related information or valuable vessels 
and ultimately may be thrown out of business by one successful cyber attack causing bil-
lions in damage.
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The size of ships has steadily increased over the years, with the largest container ships 
measuring more than 400 meters in length and carrying more than 19,000 twenty-foot 
containers. These ships need to maneuver in locks with margins that sometimes are not 
more than a few fingers. The precision in maneuvering became possible due to a number 
of propellant screws, often mounted on pods, as well as due to advanced electronic control 
systems for steering. Container ships are not in isolation. The largest cruise ships reach 362 
meters and carry more than 6,200 passengers. This involves a significant responsibility. 
Also Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers (345 meters for Q-Max class) and tankers (458 
meters for the Knock Newis) have substantial sizes. In the latter cases, it is the risk ema-
nating from their loads, which is particular critical. Besides this, the density of maritime 
traffic and the diversity of ship classes are increasing as well. Very large ships are highly 
inert and need long distances to maneuver. Other ships are highly agile and extremely 
fast. These ships mix sometimes in confined spaces such as near Rostock-Warnemünde in 
the Baltic Sea. The situation is further worsened under adverse weather conditions. In the 
A safe, efficient and environmentally friendly maritime traffic is crucial 
to the functioning of the world economy. Concepts supporting these goals 
are currently developed in e-navigation initiatives. They strongly rely on 
electronic sensing and data exchange in order to develop a joint situational 
awareness and to enable joint decision making. This is the basis for opti-
mally navigating ships in dense traffic and constrained water ways under 
all weather conditions. The surveillance implicit in e-navigation additio-
nally supports law enforcement (contraband, fraud in fishery, disposal of 
chemicals) and helps identifying preparations for terrorist actions. This 
introduces a security aspect in e-navigation which shall be addressed in 
the present paper.
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whole Baltic Sea, this leads to 100 collisions and grounding events every year (Helcom, 
2014), fortunately, most of them minor. Half of these events are due to navigation errors.
The increasing complexity of maritime navigation, which is present everywhere, led the In-
ternational Maritime Organization (IMO) to initiate its e-navigation initiative for avoiding 
collisions and groundings, reducing fuel consumption, and easing the control of vessels 
(IMO, e-Navigation, 2006). It plans to heavily rely on satellite and inertial navigation, 
radar and sonar as well as on communications amongst ships and with shore. The interwor-
king of these systems shall ensure the necessary situational awareness and support collabo-
rative decision making amongst all parties involved. The associated radio systems, electro-
nic equipments, and information systems are to be designed for robustness against known 
natural impairments, such as signal distortions and fading due to multipath, ionospheric 
propagation, unintentional interference and the like. The same systems shall also serve law 
enforcement and security by monitoring maritime movements. This includes the protection 
of fishing grounds, the identification of ships that dump materials at sea, and the prevention 
of contraband, e.g. the smuggling of arms. The parties acting against laws have a strong 
interest in evading any form of surveillance and will thus aim at manipulating e-naviga-
tion. Thus security becomes an important aspect of e-navigation. Finally hostile states at 
war and terrorists might aim at disrupting “sea transportation.” They might aim at causing 
collisions that block routes intentionally or that even cause a large number of casualties. 
Although this is currently not a significant threat, the new e-navigation system should be 
designed in such a manner that it would be difficult to cause such harmful actions. The cost 
of including adequate protections is minor now. For this reason, we recommend to address 
the cyber security threats of the companion article by Masala and Tsetsos (Masala, 2015). 
The rest of this article is structured as follows: section 2 introduces our view of e-navigati-
on; section 3 addresses the threats and counter-measures associated with the estimation of 
the own position and attitude; section 4 discusses the specifics of the Automatic Identifica-
tion System (AIS) and its evolution; section 5 addresses the sounding of the environment 
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by radar and sonar; Section 6 discusses the security of communications, and section 7 
concludes with some remarks on telecontrol.
2. E-Navigation - System Description
In the best of all worlds a ship reliably knows its position and its heading. It furthermo-
re has a complete and up-to-date picture of the status of water ways, as well as of shore 
lines, the sea bed topography, tides, weather, water currents, the height and direction of 
waves and the location of ice-fields. Most importantly, it also knows about the position and 
heading of all other ships. All this information is used to compute an optimal route in the 
sense of a quantified and acceptable risk as well as including economic and environmental 
considerations.
Figure 1:  ECDIS chart of the entrance of the port of Rostock-Warnemünde, showing the own ship,  
 AIS equipped ships and navigation aids. E-navigation will add integrity, improved situa-
 tional awareness and maneuver support. [Courtesy: P. Banys, DLR]
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The aim of e-navigation is to achieve this in a manner that is user-friendly for all people in-
volved on-board and ashore, see figure 1. The information just described shall be collected 
by a number of means, which include the ships themselves, shore equipment, and satellites. 
The ships carry sensors, which allow them to estimate their position and heading over 
ground (satellite navigation, gyros), the local direction and velocity of the wind and water 
currents (previous ones, anemometer, and speed logs), the height of tides and local sea bed 
topography (with depth and imaging sonar in addition) and wave patterns (again satellite 
and inertial navigation as well as gyros). Satellites are an ideal source for ice maps and 
maps of the coast lines. They provide information about weather and wave fields, as well 
as about maritime traffic for a short period of time. Finally, coastal radars also map ship 
movements. Coastal systems, such as Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) systems additionally 
play an important role in the integration and distribution of information. They furthermore 
have a control role. In their absence, all of this has to be handled by the ships autonomously. 
So in our view e-navigation shall not rely on the availability of coastal systems but shall 
smoothly integrate with them when they are present, and shall support whatever priorities 
maritime regulations imposes. It is obvious that the above vision requires all information 
to be reliable. This is a critical and difficult endeavor, currently addressed by the use of 
several different sensors, a careful modelling of their error characteristics, and an appro-
priate integration of the resulting information using probability theory to produce desired 
outcomes, such as a probability of collision or grounding under the assumption of a certain 
set of movement hypothesis. All of this requires that the systems are certified in the manner 
claimed and that they have not been artificially manipulated. The latter manipulation can 
be in the equipment itself, by disrupting its function through external jamming, and or by 
injecting artificial signals to obtain a measurement that does not reflect the physical reality 
(spoofing).
A large variety of manipulations at equipment level can be prevented by a tamper proof de-
sign of the hardware and a strict control of software changes. Any output of such equipment 
must be cryptographically authenticated using a key that is irrevocably deleted whenever 
a manipulation is detected. This requires the authentication of the measurement data trans-
mitted between the sensors and the processing facility, as well as a tamper proof packaging 
of the sensors themselves and of their mounts. The overall system must however remain 
stable if some equipment fails to provide the necessary authentication. Such a failure must 
lead to an increased attention. In some cases, the information might be replaced by an alter-
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native one. In other cases, there is no alternative source of information and the answer must 
involve game theoretic approaches for identifying potential strategies of malevolent parties 
and for choosing routes that avoid high risks such as the ramming of a pier by a gas tanker.
3. Positioning and Navigation
The central piece of information in e-navigation is the own position over ground r . Four 
more quantities are of similar importance – they are the vessel’s velocity over ground 
v  =dr /dt and the absolute time t, as well as the attitude α  and its derivative dα /dt. In 
maritime navigation, the latter two quantities can be reduced to heading and rate of turn. 
The full attitude is, however, needed in order to map sonar measurements, to estimate 
the response to waves and wind, as well as to control antennas for communications and 
navigation. The position, velocity, heading and rate of turn are used to avoid groundings 
and collisions with locks, piers, and other fixed objects. Time is additionally needed to 
coordinate the own movement with that of other ships. These quantities or a subset of them 
are sometimes logged for documentation purposes in fishery, for example. They are also 
reported by the Automatic Identification System (AIS) for collision avoidance and traffic 
coordination amongst ships. In both contexts, the ship’s position becomes observable to 
authorities. Thus, there is an incentive for criminal actors to modify its content. Assuming 
that the manipulation of information has been made difficult on-board, the manipulation 
has either to be performed in the signals of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
or in the signals transmitted by the AIS. The latter is addressed in a separate section.
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Figure 2:  Generic Multisensor Receiver. DLR’s current PNT unit estimates position and error bounds using 
GNSS, inertial, and speed log sensor data. 
The specification of GNSS systems is public, see e.g. (GPS Wing, 2012) for the GPS C/A and 
(Galileo-OS-SIS, 2010) for the Galileo open service, see also (Misra & Enge, 2006). These 
specifications are needed for the design of receivers. At the same time they are used to build 
simulators, which perfectly reproduce the signals transmitted by the satellites, so that 
receivers can be tested during development and production. Unfortunately, this is also the 
basis for the design of spoofing equipment which aims at misrepresenting the position, 
typically, in one target receiver. This is easiest, when the criminal actor, the so-called spoofer, 
has access to the antenna interface, which is the case presently. The spoofer then disconnects 
the antenna and injects signals from his simulator and can thus substitute the true route by a 
synthetic one. Three types of countermeasures are considered; see also (Günther, 2014):  
Figure 2:  Generic Multisensor Receiver. DLR’s current PNT unit estimates position and error  
 bounds using GNSS, inertial, and speed log sensor data.
The specification of GNSS systems is public, see e.g. (GPS Wing, 2012) for the GPS C/A 
and (Galileo-OS-SIS, 2010) for the Galileo open service, see also (Misra & Enge, 2006). 
These pecifications are ne ded for the design of receivers. At the same time they are used 
to build simulators, which perfectly reproduce the signals transmitted by the satellites, so 
that receivers can be tested during development and production. Unfortunately, this is also 
the basis for the design of spoofing equipment which aims at misrepresenting the positi-
on, typically, in one target receiver. This is easiest, when the criminal actor, the so-called 
spoofer, has access to the antenna interface, which is the case presently. The spoofer then 
disconnects the antenna and injects signals from his simulator and can thus substitute the 
true route by a synthetic one. Three types of countermeasures are considered; see also 
(Günther, 2014):
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The first one is to authenticate the satellite signals. It is very likely that Galileo will in-
tegrate such a protection in its I-Nav message, see Fernández-Hernández et al. (Fernán-
dez-Hernández, Rijmen, Seco Granados, Simón, Rodriguez, & Calle, 2014).
The second one is to integrate the antenna and receiver in a tamper-proof manner. 
The third one is to continuously run the positioning system and to evaluate measurements 




With the decreasing size of receiver chips, it is no more difficult to integrate the analog 
front-end and the pre-processing in the antenna – first modules which at least partially 
implement this program exist, see e.g. the sensor module of ANAVS (ANavS, 2015). The 
simulator could still capture the receiver by injecting the signal into the antenna in a very 
careful manner. In this case, the third defense, the evaluation of other sensors would cons-
train the trajectories to remain in the error budgets of the other sensors. Inertial measure-
ments provide accelerations and turn rates. They are nearly impossible to manipulate. The 
high-end of such equipment includes laser gyro and supports autonomous navigation over 
long periods of 
time - unfortunately they are very expensive. Recent developments in the low price sector 
are very promising. First products have announced drift rates of 6 degrees per hour. This 
permits to constrain the manipulation of the GNSS signal and even to bridge short GNSS 
outages. The position uncertainty grows linearly with speed logs, while this is with the third 
power for inertial measurements. This makes speed measurements attractive whenever the 
water currents are known. From a security perspective one has to consider the possibility 
of influencing speed log measurements by using small propellers under the ship’s hull. 
Doppler sonars could solve that problem by taking profiles at random distances. In shallow 
waters with a stable sea bed, they could even be used for measuring “absolute” movement. 
Although, rogue mariners can misrepresent their position, the design of countermeasures is 
easier and the cost of countermeasures is lower than the cost of spoofing. Figure 2 shows a 
generic setup of a multisensory receiver for Position Navigation and Time (PNT). DLR’s 
development of a PNT unit integrates GNSS, inertial, and speed log information to genera-
te a robust solution (Ziebold, Dai, Lanca, Noack, & Engler, 2013). 
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Figure 3:  Antenna array in two different sizes (upper right), mounted on a ship under a radom  
 (left), and multi-antenna receiver (lower right). [Courtesy: Dr. Achim Hornbostel DLR]
A second scenario is that terrorists aim at disrupting the navigation of a ship in a critical 
situation, e.g. of an LNG at the entrance of a port. Since GNSS signals are extremely weak, 
more than one million times weaker than mobile radio signals, they can easily be jammed. 
“Jamming” means superposing a signal to the received signal, in order to prevent the recei-
ver from being able to estimate its position. Jammers typically disrupt signal reception in a 
whole area, but sophisticated jammer could also direct their interfering signal to a particu-
lar ship. The ship under attack can defend itself by nulling out the jammer, e.g. using an an-
tenna arrays to suppress the signal coming from the direction of the jammer. DLR’s Galant 
receiver, see Figure 3, achieves the best published performance in this respect (Hornbostel, 
et al., 2013). Its most advanced version uses a dual approach, which suppresses the jammer 
before correlation (jammer above the noise) and after correlation (residuals in the noise). 
The jammer can overcome this barrier by increasing its signal power. In this case, the ves-
sels positioning algorithm has to de-weight the satellite measurements in the multisensory 
receiver and to rely on other sensors. Short jamming periods can be easily bridged using 
inertial measurements. Speed-logs are sometimes helpful as well. Additionally, in critical 
shore areas, straights, and ports, radars have a sufficient number of characteristic reflectors 
to also support navigation.
Jamming of GNSS is considered a critical threat. It is applied by the military in conflict 
situations. North Korea is reported to have jammed GNSS reception in South Korea a 
number of times (Gallagher, 2012). Jamming also happened in peaceful environments. In 
Newark NY, USA, so-called Personal Privacy Devices (PPD) jammed the GPS Landing 
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System. The PPDs are used to protect against being tracked by data loggers, e.g. those 
installed in the vehicles of logistic companies. They are illegal and often much more dis-
ruptive than intended.
Due to the sensitivity of GNSS to jamming, the UK, South Korea and recently the US are 
reconsidering the use of LORAN as a backup system. LORAN is a terrestrial short wave 
radio navigation system with a number of virtues. Its ground installation consists of trans-
mitters with a power of 100-4,000 kW and antennas that are 100 and more meters high. 
This is the system’s strength, since it makes it difficult for jammers to generate significant 
disturbances. On the downside, the operation of such infrastructures is very expensive. The 
same applies to the investment needed to extend LORAN to a global scale. The so-called 
R-Mode aims at using Medium Frequency (MF) communication signals for navigation 
(Johnson, Swaszek, Alberding, Hoppe, & Oltmann, 2014). R-mode promises to provide a 
cost-effective backup solution. The principle of using communication signals for navigati-
on could also be extended to other communication standards. The aim is to jointly use all 
available signals in order to obtain a very robust and reliable position estimate.
Another class of threats is the misleading of a vessel’s satellite navigation system by injec-
ting artificial signals through the antenna. It is unclear whether it ever happened, except for 
demonstration purposes (Spoofing a Superyacht at Sea, 2013). Spoofing would be a highly 
aggressive act. The aim could be the hijacking of a ship with a precious load by pirates, 
the sinking of a ship in a harbor entrance during war or the use of a ship as a weapon in an 
act of terrorism. In these cases, the authentic satellite signals are be substituted by artificial 
ones. Like in the case of on-board spoofing, the inclusion of other sensors in the solution is 
a central element in the countermeasures. Additionally, there are a number of methods for 
detecting spoofing signals, as well as for eliminating them. The most powerful of all is ob-
tained by using the DLR Galant receiver to estimate the direction of arrival of the signals. 
This forces the spoofer to reconstruct the complete wave field, which is a difficult task. The 
associated complexity and know-how is unlikely to be managed by pirates or terrorists. 
The suitable combination of a multi-antenna receiver with inertial sensors, a stable clock 
and a speed log can be considered safe with respect to all practical threats.
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4. Automatic Information System (AIS)
AIS is a system designed to provide the own position and course to neighboring ships in 
order to prevent collisions. The own position can either be determined using GPS or using 
a multisensory receiver. Additionally, AIS may also be used by coastal systems to mark 
the location of buoys, rocks or shallow waters, so-called Aids to Navigation (AtoN). In 
this case, the information is transmitted by a centralized installation. Finally, AIS marks 
locations of ships in distress or of men over board. The associated equipment is called AIS 
Search and Rescue Transmitter (AIS-SART).
Beyond this, AIS is used for surveillance purposes as already exposed. The latter is the 
primary incentive for manipulations. Such manipulations have been described and perfor-
med by Balduzzi, Pasta, Wilhoit (Balduzzi, Pasta, & Wilhoit, 2014). In our view the most 
important ones are:










In the first two cases, we assume that the ship’s installation is protected against spoofing, 
which means that the spoofer cannot misuse the ship’s authentic AIS. He has to install a 
spoofing AIS next to it. With this second installation, he overpowers the authentic signal 
in a manner that does not trigger a slot reallocation in the AIS protocol. This requires the 
spoofing signal to never be earlier than the authentic signal. Two options for the spoofing 
signal exist: it might overlay the authentic AIS with a signal of greater power and of a 
different content to capture the receiver or it might simply jam the transmission by ge-
nerating a cluster of false AIS messages and create a new message at another time delay 
and/or frequency. In this manner, the spoofer can pretend to be in another location or to be 
associated with a different ship. The first approach could be detected by the receiver, due 
to the imperfect suppression of the authentic signal. The second approach is more difficult 
to detect if the spoofer is smart. This allows for the mentioned frauds such as fishing in 
forbidden areas, dumping material at sea, smuggling, and the like. The countermeasure to 
the second threat is to authenticate the message. Specifically, every vessel has a private and 
a public key. Each transmitter signs its messages using its private key, and each receiver 
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verifies it with the public key. The latter one is published and authenticated by a public 
authority such as IMO. The list of public keys is continuously updated, e.g. over satellite 
by interrogating each ship whether its security system has been tampered. The protocol is 
a challenge response scheme, which involves the private key. The private key is erased, 
whenever a tamper attempt was made. This mechanism also protects against spoofing from 
on-shore or from another nearby ship when it aims at moving the ship in the AIS situational 
awareness of the other ships and VTS systems.
It is always possible to disappear from AIS monitoring by cutting electricity, destroying the 
transmitter or by covering the antenna with aluminum foil. The two countermeasures are 
the continuous tracking of ships even at sea as well as independent means of observation. 
The former is supported by the deployment of AIS receivers on satellites. There are cur-
rently 19 units in space under the control of different operators and administrators. Another 
17 are due to be launched very soon. Additionally, aircraft can also be used for such tasks. 
The integration of corresponding reception capabilities is not complex from a technical 
point of view and could thus be considered on a broad scale. The overlay of aeronautical 
and maritime routes is such that more than 95% of the ships could be covered. On major 
routes the update rate would be several times per hour (Plass, Poehlmann, Hermenier, & 
Dammann, 2015). Radar is the primary independent means of observation. Many vessels 
are equipped with radars. Additionally space-born radars observe the scene intermittently. 
In both cases ship locations without AIS signals – so-called dark targets - are easily spotted 
and the information about them can be communicated to law enforcement and other ships. 
Pirates can use AIS in different ways. The first one is to learn about the course of victim 
vessels. This is favored by the information from AIS, which includes the destination port, 
the load of the ship and the like. The risk of being hijacked causes vessels to switch/off 
their AIS transmitters in certain regions of the world. This puts them at risk, however, since 
the intended collision protection disappears. Any protection against this threat is a critical 
trade-off between safety and security. A possible compromise is that ships indicate their 
sole presence in a certain sector, potentially via satellite in order to escape triangulation. As 
a consequence of this, other ships know about their presence. In a second step ships enter 
into a mutual authentication and key exchange procedure. This leads to the provision of 
instantaneous public keys available to all trusted ships, which normally are all ships. The 
vessels then encrypt their messages using their instantaneous private keys. The receiving 
parties can decrypt them using the corresponding instantaneous public keys. Contrary to 
the vessels public key, the instantaneous public key is only known to parties that entered 
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into a pairing procedure, which is a trusted process. A second approach to capture ships is 
to involve them in a search and rescue operation by transmitting AIS-SART 
messages – ships are obliged to participate in such rescue operations and are thus vulnerab-
le to this threat. Authentication prevents messages from being planted too easily but there 
is still the option to sink a real ship in order to capture a fat pray. 
Finally, vessels can be confused by manipulating AIS messages reporting about ships, 
rocks, and navigation aids or by generating artificial ones. A judicious choice of false AIS 
information may induce the crew to perform a sequence of maneuvers that ends in a colli-
sion. This threat needs again be protected by authentication.
In conclusion, message authentication and the consistency of data with other measure-
ments such as radar plots are effective methods to detect manipulations. Authentication 
increases the data volume. The associated capacity problem is addressed in Section 7.
 
5. Radar and Sonar
Radars are currently the primary means of navigation required by COLREGS, i.e. the 
IMO’s collision avoidance regulation (IMO, COLREGS - International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972). Radars transmit a pulsed waveform which is reflected 
by the target ship and by objects surrounding that ship. The distance of the ship is estimated 
from the round-trip delay. The relative velocity is obtained from the Doppler-shift of the 
echo. The estimation of position and velocity required different pulse repetition frequen-
cies in the past. Thus different radars or at least modes were used. Modern systems with 
appropriate waveforms and digital correlation can combine both modes more easily. The 
antennas of radars are highly directive in order to maximize the signal to noise ratio of the 
signal received after reflection by the target. A complete picture of the surroundings is ob-
tained by spinning the antenna at a rate of a few cycles per minute. The various echoes are 
thus aligned on a ray for each value of the azimuth angle, resulting in the usual polar plots 
seen on radar screens; see (Skolnik, 2001). Modern radars have an “Automatic Radar Plot-
ting Aid” (ARPA) function, which automatically tracks objects, shows their trajectory, and 
computes the closest point of approach. Radar visibility can be increased by using radar 
corner retroreflectors. They are used on navigation aids or on wooden ships, for example. 
The signals of maritime radars are in one of two frequency bands: the S- and the X-band. 
The longer wavelength of the S-band allows for a slightly longer range. Typical ranges are 
up to 35-50 nm. Harbor operations are performed using reduced power settings.
Radars have the enormous benefit of locating any object with a sufficient cross section at a 
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certain distance. Radars are, however, affected by spurious reflections (clutter), e.g. caused 
by a rough sea or by strong rain. The accuracy of the estimation of the attitude, location and 
velocity is a function of the clutter surrounding the target, the distance of the target and its 
radar cross section. Finally, ships might be hidden beyond other ones or might appear as 
a single target although they are two. Besides collision avoidance radars are also used for 
surveillance purposes. For this reason, certain navigators want to hide from radar signals. 
A first option is to design stealth ships. This is an option used by the military and by some 
coast guards. It is costly and hardly accessible to criminals. The latter are more likely to 
resort to electronic countermeasures. The two main countermeasures to evade radar detec-
tions are again jamming and spoofing. Jamming means that the reflected signal is drown 
in a sea of noise, which makes it impossible to retrieve useful distance information. The 
angular location of the jammer is more difficult to hide. 
Alternatively, the opponent might also induce the radar in error by generating false echoes. 
This might prevent a surveillance ship from moving any further towards the spoofer since 
it is expecting an obstacle between itself and the spoofer. It might also cause a regular 
ship to change its course and enter unsafe waters. This can be prevented if the radar uses 
waveforms under control of a cryptogenerator. In this case, the spoofer can no more pre-
dict the shape of the echoes. Radars are and should remain a central element for maritime 
collision avoidance, since they can also detect ships that are not transmitting AIS signals 
but their signals should be hardened in the manner described.
At DLR, Heymann is fusing AIS and radar information; see e.g. (Heymann, Banys, & 
Noack, 2014). This means that the AIS information is matched with radar targets. The 
augmented information is then displayed in an ARPA like manner on the ships display. 
Additionally, dark targets, i.e. targets that do not transmit AIS signals, can be marked by 
the transmission of an AIS message, which describes their navigational data. This prevents 
ships that are not equipped with radars from colliding with such objects.
In a future networked maritime world, radars can be further enhanced by using the mul-
ti-static principle. In this case, several radars cooperate: one radar is transmitting while 
several others are receiving the echoes. The measurement results are then exchanged and 
jointly processed. In the next cycle, another radar illuminates the scene and so on. This 
leads to a much better resolution in complex situations (Bethke, Röde, & Schroth, 2002) 
but requires a high rate link between the cooperating radars.
Sonars are similar to radars. They operate under water using acoustical waves. Sonars are 
typically used in shallow waters to prevent grounding. They might just be echo sounders 
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for determining the depth or they might image some portions or the whole sea floor under 
the ship. In the latter case, they could be used for navigation in areas with a stable sea 
floor. Since many harbors have a sea access through a river and a highly variable sea floor 
this is currently not considered. Sonars are not very suitable to locate other ships since the 
propagation along the surface is often unpredictable. Submarines are an obvious exception, 
here propagation is in the bulk of the water volume, and sonars are correspondingly used 
by submarines and by surface ships to locate each other.
6. Communications and Traffic Awareness
The above developments suggest that cryptographically secured radio links amongst ships 
should play an important role in e-navigation. Furthermore, the current data rates of a few 
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kilobits at best must be increased substantially to cover the needs of a safe, secure and route 
optimizing system.  






forecasts, urgent safety 
information 
All All Digital, Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) 
Medium (MF) and High Frequency (HF) 
100 Bd 
Maritime Very High 
Frequency (VHF)  
(Voice communications) 
Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS), general 
communications, 
search and rescue 
All Only ship-to-ship on 
high seas  
Analog, Frequency Modulation (FM), Frequency 
division multiple access (FDMA) 
VHF: 156-162 MHz 




also traffic awareness 
information, Aids to 
Navigation and Search 
and Rescue 
All Only ship-to-ship on 
high seas  
Digital, Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK), 
Self-Organized Time Division Multiple Access 
(SOTDMA) 
VHF: 161.975 and 162.025 MHz 
9.6 kbps 
Digital Selective Calling 
(DSC) 
Distress signaling All Only ship-to-ship on 
high seas  
Digital, FSK 
MF, HF, VHF 
1.2 kBd 
COSPAS/SARSAT Distress beacon All GEO/MEO/LEO 
satellites 
in polar regions only 
MEO/LEO 
GPS-Positioning/Digital  
UHF: 406.022-406.076 MHz 
Location Msg with 15,22, or  
30 characters 
additionally Doppler positioning from LEO and MEO 
satellites 




and satellite system 
All All Digital: Phase Shift Keying, FD-TDMA 
VHF: 156-162 MHz 
terrestrial: 300 kbps 
satellite: 240 kbps 
Table 1:  Maritime communications systems for voice and data (IALA, Maritime radio communications plan 
edition 2, October 2012). The areas are: port, coastal, high seas and polar. The links are ship-shore, 
ship-ship and ship-satellite. 
Today communications are typically specialized for a particular application and narrow band. 
A VHF Data Exchange (VDE) System (IALA, Technical Characteristics for a VHF Data Exchange 
System in the VHF Maritime Moble Band, 2015) is a first promising step to change this 
situation. The request for a frequency allocation at the next World Administrative Radio 
Conference (WRC) in 2015 is under preparation (ITU, 2014). VDE shall have a ship-to-ship, a 
ship-to-shore and ship-to-satellite component. The associated satellites shall be Low Earth 
Orbiting (LEO) satellites. The terrestrial and satellite components shall share a piece of 
spectrum in a judicious manner. In the long-term, the whole maritime communication shall 
be migrated to generic digital channels using the frequency bands best adapted to the range 
Table 1:  Maritime communications systems for voice and data (IALA, Maritime radio communica 
 tions plan edition 2, October 2012). The areas are: port, coastal, high seas and polar. The  
 links are ship-shore, ship-ship and ship-satellite.
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Today communications are typically specialized for a particular application and narrow 
band. A VHF Data Exchange (VDE) System (IALA, Technical Characteristics for a VHF 
Data Exchange System in the VHF Maritime Moble Band, 2015) is a first promising step to 
change this situation. The request for a frequency allocation at the next World Administra-
tive Radio Conference (WRC) in 2015 is under preparation (ITU, 2014). VDE shall have a 
ship-to-ship, a ship-to-shore and ship-to-satellite component. The associated satellites shall 
be Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites. The terrestrial and satellite components shall share 
a piece of spectrum in a judicious manner. In the long-term, the whole maritime communi-
cation shall be migrated to generic digital channels using the frequency bands best adapted 
to the range that the signal, have to travel for reaching their destination. Besides collision 
avoidance, the main services used today include 
   Dissemination of weather information, location of icebergs, lost containers and the like
   Distress signaling and beacons
   Coordination amongst ships, as well as with shore
Besides this, communication links are used by ship owners for logistics and for staying in 
contact with their crews as well as by passengers for telephony, internet access, and enter-
tainment. Today, weather information is textual and Navtex - the system used – is a telex. 
This servive shall be migrated to VDE broadcast from shore or LEO satellites. Distress 
signaling is well covered: it might be by voice on VHF channel 16, by digital signaling 
through the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) system or by COSPAS/SARSAT beacons. 
The functions of coordination by Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS), of remote pilotage, and 
of joint decision making are currently handled by analog voice in the VHF band. They 
shall additionally be supported by VDE in the future. The latter system has the potential of 
taking-over an important role in all three functions (dissemination, distress signaling and 
coordination). VDE system is currently in the concept phase and is the most promising 
option for introducing security. Ship-owners have the option to communicate by any wide 
area standard, including geostationary (GEO) L-band systems, LEO L-band systems, and 
in the future VDE over LEO satellites. But even this information should be encrypted, not 
only for protecting ths shipowner’s business but also for preventing pirates and terrorists to 
learn about the ship’s position and load. Finally, passengers will use any system available. 
Large cruise ships provide on-board cellular and the like and use backhauling via GEO 
or MEO satellites. Table 1 lists the most important current and future systems relevant to 
maritime traffic coordination.





be solved. Trustworthiness is critical for most forms of deep cooperation – since such co-
operation might put people, ships, and their cargo at risk if a malevolent party can either 
falsify or inject erroneous information. AIS can be seen as a first prototype for the exchan-
ge of sensor data. Some ideas for creating trusted reports were discussed in the context of 
AIS. The question will be how to keep track of trustworthiness or more precisely: how to 
identify pirate ships or ships that intend at harming others. Alarms triggered by the crew or 
by any form of tampering are certainly meaningful means for isolating information flows 
from and to ships. Departures from expected behaviors are other indicators that must be 
carefully analyzed as well. They may also be due distress situations. Pirates and rogue cap-
tains will do the outmost to not unintentionally trigger such alerts. Thus it is important that 
the whole sensor and communication system is built in a manner which prevents external 
manipulation.
7. Telecontrol
With telecontrol, pilots do not necessarily need to be on-board of ships while entering 
a port or passing a water way such as the panama channel. This would allow for a more 
effective use of the human resource “pilot”, since they would not loose time for transfers 
and would not be locked-up with a ship during uncritical parts of the itinerary. The same 
shortage of resources also exits for captains and other skilled crew members. Automation 
might be a solution in this context. The EU has financed the project MUNIN to address 
these issues (MUNIN Project Web Page, 2012). Additionally, telecontrol could also reduce 
the chance that pirates take control of ships. In this context all systems would have to be 
secured in a manner that prevents a cyber capture of the ship. 
For a serious consideration of telecontrol, the latter must be designed in such a way that 
the radio links are highly available, that radio link outages can be bridged by autonomous 
control and that the controls cannot be manipulated by breaking the cryptosystem. There is 
still quite some work to be done to achieve that.
8. Conclusion
E-navigation is a big opportunity for significantly reducing the number of collisions and 
groundings. It bears a huge potential for reducing the cost of operations and the environ-
mental impact of maritime traffic. Furthermore, it provides means for surveillance in fis-
hery, contraband, and most importantly for reducing the risk of piracy and terrorism. These 
goals can be achieved if the systems are properly designed from the start. In this case, the 
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cost impact of the additional functionality would not be very significant. We thus recom-
mend that the specification of a secure e-navigation system and its deployment receive a 
high priority.
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